Malcolm
Gladwell did miss something in this chapter. What is it? Before explaining his
fallacy, I should first describe how Malcolm Gladwell explained an
interestingly high rate of plane crash Korean Air, the largest airline of
Korea, had in 1990s despite its well-trained pilots and its so-called “classic”
planes. The gist of his explanation is very simple yet very convincing: Koreans’
tendency to give into authority made it highly difficult for first or second
pilots, who are in charge of flight information, to directly express to the
captain their opinions about problems of the plane and such “mitigated”
attitude let the captain ignore pivotal warnings and results in plane crash. As
seen in many of the examples Gladwell comes up with, the less direct such
messages were, the more likely the accidents were to happen. That is to say, if
Koreans had a more “Americanness” in them-actually now Korean pilots are taught
to be more self-assertive-the accidents could be prevented. However, throughout
his explanations he seems to have forgotten to ask why. Why are Koreans or why
did they become less self-assertive than Americans? And the answer to this inquiry
must give the solution to the problem in question.
After
suffering 36 years of colonial rule of Japanese empire and a devastating Korean
civil war, Koreans simply lost their last power to improve their situations.
Lands for agriculture were impoverished, manufacturing industries collapsed,
government unorganized and powerless. Nobody, even the most optimistic person,
could expect Korea becoming economically successful. Can you believe that
Koreans admired Myanmar for its successful economy and that South Korean
economy was even worse than North Korean? Of course you can’t; however that was
the status quo: Korean economy just couldn’t get worse. Even governmental plan
for economic development was stymied because of political instability. Under
such circumstances came Park Jung Hee: a successful dictator who came into his
power as a military leader, stabilized political turmoil, and launched a series
of economic development plan that transformed Korea. His goal as a pious
patriot was as straightforward as a laser light: Economic development of Korea.
His 5-year economic development plans were implemented so strictly and were
miraculously successful. He did make something out of nothing by leading Korean
people to do whatever work they could do and should do. Koreans worked in even
the most hazardous environment such as desert of Middle East. Plus, he nurtured
Korean industry with every government support, for instance tariff barrier or
government aid, and established basic infrastructure for the cheapest price.
Dissidents were suppressed and even tiny interference was not tolerated. People
worked as their bosses ordered, bosses ordered as government ordered, government
ordered as the president planned. This process, philosophically backed up by
Korean legacy of Confucianism, an ideology which requires people to pursue the
value of loyalty and respect, required strict hierarchy and unquestioning obedience
to achieve the necessary efficiency.
This
legacy must be present at Korean Air, too. They must have thought that, if
other pilots work as the captain orders, then there should be no problem. But
the reality wasn’t as what they expected. Rather it was an accident rate 17
times larger than that of United Airline! It was a national catastrophe. People
were dying out of plane crash so often that Korean Air was losing its
credentials in worldwide aviation industry. But Korean Air, when it initially
met with such difficulty, no major change was made. Here rises another question
on why didn’t they try to solve the problem even though they knew that
something was wrong. My answer to this question is that Koreans didn’t want to
and therefore simply couldn’t deny their own belief in their reason of success.
The
the baby-boom generation of Korea, so-called 486 generation, which means that
they were at the age of 40s, went to college at 80s, and were born in 60s, was
taught in school to follow order and authority of seniors, teachers, and
parents, or to be true, of any one who is superior to them. The basic concept
of hierarchy started there. They were also trained in their workplace to follow
order, official procedure, authority of seniors, and rules of the business. The
magic there was that all they did and all they achieved were at first so
successful that there was no place for doubt or question. The concept of
hierarchy and its successfulness became virtually indelible. So the 90s, when
this generation was socially active and led Korean society, the system of
hierarchy was everything this society knew about success. Koreans were
ignorant, or maybe they desired to be ignorant, about how doubts, questions,
opposing ideas can make a good system better. Therefore, when crisis was
emerging and its signs even had been sighted before, nobody could attribute the
crisis to the system itself. If they did so, it was to castigate their own glorious
history in which Korean economy outwitted that of North Korea or Myanmar.
With
this answer, I would now give a very important advice to Malcolm Gladwell,
which he might need when he wants to improve his book, Outliers. If he really
wishes to add the solution part-how to improve situation and solve the
problem-I recommend him to say that as far as the Korean culture of high-power
distance is concerned, the very simple solution is to teach them how to doubt,
how to question, how to make opposing arguments, and, last but not least, how
to respond to them ‘properly.’ Once given the idea that having doubts,
questions, and opposing ideas can help solve such problems, Koreans will
transform, not matter how difficult it is to do so, and prove to the world that
they are not going to turn back into their previous state of poverty and
hopelessness.
